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I. INTRODUCTION
With the exception of professional baseball, most professional
sports are not immune from antitrust scrutiny by virtue of their
popularity.' The unique nature of professional sports, however,
justifies different treatment under these laws from that of other
industries.2 To the extent that an alleged anti-competitive practice
is a product of the collective bargaining process, the relationship
* B.S.B.A., 1986, University of Arizona; J.D., 1990, University of Oregon School of Law.
1. The Supreme Court originally granted professional baseball antitrust immunity in
Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball, 259 U.S.
200 (1922) (Baseball does not operate in interstate commerce and therefore is not subject to
the antitrust laws.). Even though the courts now view baseball as operating in interstate
commerce, its exemption has survived because stare decisis requires this curious result to be
corrected by Congress. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). See also Professional Baseball
Schools & Clubs, Inc. v. Kuhn, 693 F.2d 1085 (11th Cir. 1982) (affirming baseball's exemp-
tion). The baseball exemption is an anomaly. See, e.g., Radovich v. National Football
League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (football); Washington Professional Basketball Corp. v. Na-
tional Basketball Ass'n, 147 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (basketball); Philadelphia World
Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (hockey);
United States v. International Boxing Club of N.Y., Inc., 348 U.S. 236 (1955) (professional
boxing); Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (golf);
Gunter Harz Sports, Inc. v. United States Tennis Ass'n, 665 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1981) (ten-
nis); National Wrestling Alliance v. Myers, 325 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1963) (wrestling); Wash-
ington State Bowling Proprietor's Ass'n v. Pacific Lanes, Inc., 356 F.2d 371 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 963 (1966) (bowling); STP Corp. v. United States Auto Club, Inc., 286 F.
Supp. 146 (S.D. Ind. 1968) (auto racing).
2. See, e.g., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976), afj'd in part,
rev'd in part, 593 F.2d 1173, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (The nature of competition "for player
talent may vary from an absolute 'free market' norm"; thus, practices which might other-
wise be unlawful per se are analyzed under the antitrust law's Rule of Reason.).
1
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between labor law and antitrust law must be clarified,3 particularly
in the context of an expired agreement.
4
The non-statutory labor exemption is a judicial creation, spe-
cifically designed to accommodate competing labor and antitrust
interests.5 The exemption generally protects concerted manage-
ment and union activity from the reach of the antitrust laws.6
As originally intended, the exemption favors the collective
bargaining process as a means of resolving labor disputes. In sports
litigation, courts evince a preference for labor law and policy over
antitrust concerns when: (1) the trade restraints affect only the
parties to the collective bargaining agreement; (2) the agreement
concerns mandatory subjects of collective bargaining; and (3) the
agreement is the product of bona fide, arms-length negotiations.
7
This analysis, which courts have relied upon in subsequent cases,8
originated in Mackey v. National Football League.9
In Mackey, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals limited its
holding to current agreements, stating that it "need not decide
whether the effect of an agreement extends beyond its formal expi-
ration date for purposes of the labor exemption." 10 Courts later de-
termined that this analytic framework was relevant in determining
the applicability of the labor exemption after the termination of an
agreement." Because the results in subsequent cases have been in-
consistent, the issue is whether courts are properly applying these
standards in either situation. These varying outcomes can be ex-
3. See infra text accompanying notes 33-64.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 65-98.
5. See Connell Const. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975); Local 189
Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965); United Mine Workers v.
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3 Int'l Bd. of Elec.
Workers, 325 U.S. 797 (1945); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
6. Several statutory exemptions also exist. The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1990)
and 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1990), and the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 105-15 (1990), grant
antitrust immunity to labor union activities, not to employer-imposed restraints. The statu-
tory exemptions are beyond the scope of this Article.
7. Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 616 (8th Cir. 1976) cert. dis-
missed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977) (player restraint rules affect only parties to the agreement and
are mandatory subjects of collective bargaining within the National Labor Relations Act).
8. See, e.g., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); McCourt v.
California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979); Zimmerman v. National Football
League, 632 F. Supp. 398 (D.D.C. 1986). But see Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 809
F.2d 954, 962 n.6 (2d Cir. 1987).
9. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
10. Id. at 616 n.18.
11. See, e.g., Powell v. National Football League, 888 F.2d 559 (8th Cir. 1989), cert.
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plained, in part, by differing interpretations of the third criterion,
which requires that there be bona fide, arms-length bargaining be-
tween the parties.
12
The current malaise in professional football contracts involves
the scope of the exemption after the collective bargaining agree-
ment expires. Since 1987,13 the National Football League (NFL)
and the National Football League Players' Association (NFLPA)
have not reached a new agreement. The free agency issue, which
concerns a player's unrestricted right to sell his or her services to
the highest bidder, has been the principal cause of the stalemate.14
This disagreement led to the twenty-seven day players' strike of
1987.15 The strike failed to resolve the issue, frustrated in large
part by the success of replacement games.16 The players' insistence
on greater free agency led to their attempts at redress in the
courts.
In Powell v. National Football League, s the players chal-
lenged the First Refusal/Compensation system, as implemented
under the NFL-NFLPA 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA), as a violation of the antitrust laws. 9 This system provided
that "a team could retain a veteran free agent by exercising a right
of first refusal and by matching a competing club's offer. ' 20 Fur-
thermore, "[i]f the old team decided not to match the offer, the old
team would receive compensation from the new team in the form
of additional draft choices"'" based on the player's "qualifying of-
fer" and number of years in the League.2
12. See supra text accompanying note 7.
13. NFL-NFLPA 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement, art. XXXVIII (expired Au-
gust 31, 1987) [hereinafter 1982 CBA].
14. Holford, Punt, Impasse or Kick: The 1987 NFLPA Antitrust Action, 22 AKRON L.
REV. 61, 67 (1988). See Singman, Free Agency and the National Football League, 8 Loy.
ENT. L.J. 259, 268-270 (1988).
15. Holford, supra note 14, at 68.
16. Id. See also Powell, 888 F.2d at 570 n.8 (Heaney, J., dissenting) (strike unsuccess-
ful because many players' futures are seldom secure beyond their short careers).
17. The district court in Powell did not believe that the plaintiffs were "demanding
unrestricted free agency, but only that a player be free to move, without substantial restric-
tion, at some point in his career." Powell v. National Football League, 687 F. Supp. 777, 789
n.22 (D. Minn. 1988) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter Powell I].
18. 888 F.2d 559 (8th Cir. 1989).
19. Id. at 561.
20. Id. Not one of the 1415 eligible veteran free agents changed teams during the term
of the 1982 agreement.
21. Id.
22. 1982 CBA, supra note 13, at art. XV. The First Refusal/Compensation system re-
sulted in less movement between teams than occurred under the Rozelle Rule. Powell I, 678
F. Supp. at 781 n.6. See also Powell v. National Football League, 690 F. Supp. 812, 813 (D.
1991]
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The district court found it "probable that the players [would]
prevail at trial and that at least some of the players [would] suffer
irreparable harm .. ."" Additionally, the district court held that
the labor exemption expires when the parties reach an impasse in
bargaining over the issue of free agency, thereby "allowing [the]
players' antitrust suit to move forward ... 24 In an attempt to
protect the collective bargaining process from the threat of anti-
trust litigation, however, the court refused to issue a preliminary
injunction on the ground that it would "offend the central purpose
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act," which is to limit the use of injunc-
tive relief in labor disputes. 5
On February 1, 1989, pending an appeal to the Eighth Circuit,
the NFL unilaterally implemented a new free agency system, Plan
B, which allows teams to protect thirty-seven players.2  A pro-
tected player can seek offers from new teams provided he is not
under contract for the next season.17 In this situation, Plan B clas-
sifies these players as conditional or restricted free agents subject
to a revised First Refusal/Compensation system.2 8 The players left
unprotected, whether or not under contract, enjoy unrestricted
movement between teams and become free agents each year.29
Minn. 1988) (two players changed teams during 1988, when the draft choice compensation
system was extended without player approval) [hereinafter Powell II. The Rozelle Rule
postulates:
[Wihen a player's contractual obligation to a team expires and he signs with a
different club, the signing club must provide compensation to the player's for-
mer team. If the two clubs are unable to conclude mutually satisfactory arrange-
ments, the Commissioner may award compensation in the form of one or more
players and/or draft choices as he deems fair and equitable.
Powell, 888 F.2d at 562 (quoting Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 609 n.1
(8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977)). In Mackey, the Eighth Circuit deter-
mined that the Rozelle Rule was an unlawful restraint on trade. In that case, four players
changed teams "under circumstances in which Commissioner Rozelle awarded compensation
to the old team." Brief for Appellee at 8, Powell v. National Football League, 888 F.2d 559
(8th Cir. 1989) (No. 89-5091) (citing Mackey, 543 F.2d at 611).
23. Powell H, 690 F. Supp. at 818.
24. Id. at 818 n.10. One scholar argues that the First Refusal/Compensation system "is
another example of a rule limiting mobility with no effect on competitive balance." Ross,
Monopoly Sports Leagues, 73 MINN. L. REV. 643, 676 n.154 (1989). Moreover, "[tihe ability
to sell or buy goods or services as long as one merely equals offers from rivals long has been
recognized as anti-competitive." Id. (citations omitted).
25. Powell H, 690 F. Supp. at 814. But see Robertson v, National Basketball Ass'n,
389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 556 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1977) (Norris-LaGuardia Act
does not apply in an antitrust suit even if it involves a labor dispute).
26. NFL-NFLPA 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement, as amended by Plan B.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. The NFL defendants in Powell claimed that more than one-third of the NFL play-
ers would be eligible each year as unconditional free agents. See Brief for Appellant at 12-13
[Vol. 8:121
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The Powell district court would have allowed the antitrust
case to proceed after the parties had reached a bargaining impasse,
but because the Eighth Circuit reversed, the legality of the First
Refusal/Compensation system remains unresolved. 0 On denial of
petition for rehearing en banc, Judge Lay, dissenting, argued that
the Eighth Circuit's holding provides a "Shangri-la of everlasting
immunity from the antitrust laws," thereby delaying any meaning-
ful resolution to this problem. 3'
This Article reviews the relevant case law interpreting the ap-
plication of the non-statutory labor exemption in professional
sports. The exemption effectively bars courts from reviewing
league rules that restrain player mobility. Although the exemption
is limited by the standards announced in Mackey,3" the circum-
stances surrounding its expiration are frequently contested. Even if
this limited exemption is extended to the end of the collective bar-
gaining relationship, as proposed by the Eighth Circuit in Powell,33
antitrust suits challenging Plan B are likely to emerge. 34 Because
the NFLPA is intent upon terminating this labor-management re-
lationship, courts will undoubtedly confront this issue. Indeed, this
possibility could eventually produce a settlement and a new collec-
tive bargaining agreement materially different from Plan B. 5
n.6, Powell v. National Football League, 888 F.2d 559 (8th Cir. 1989) (No. 89-5091). Plain-
tiffs argued, however, that "the new system simply allows teams to release expendable play-
ers." Brief for Appellee at 16. Commentators seemingly agree with the players: "Some of
these players will probably achieve success as free agents, but most are too old, injured, or
unskilled to have a major impact." Staudohar & McAtee, Free Agency in Sports: Plum or
Prune?, 40 LAB. L.J. 228, 231 (1989).
30. Powell, 888 F.2d at 568 (court stated that it "need not decide the issues left un-
resolved by th[e] opinion").
31. Id. at 573 (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
32. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
33. See infra text accompanying note 82.
34. Such a suit was filed in Newark, N.J. on April 10, 1990. Eight restricted NFL
players did not receive offers to play for new teams, and alleged that Plan B is responsible.
USA Today, Apr. 11, 1990, at 9C, col. 1. This case was removed to the District Court of
Minnesota and has a trial date set for February 1992. Amended complaint, McNeil v. Na-
tional Football League (Civ. No. 4-90-476) (D. Minn., filed April 30, 1991).
35. Another contributing factor likely to ease tensions between the two sides is the
record four-year, $3.56 billion television package the NFL recently negotiated with ABC,
NBC, and CBS. Wall St. J., Mar. 12, 1990, at B5, col. 1. This agreement constitutes a 90%
increase from the previous deal. Id. The League has yet to sell the rights to Super Bowl
XXVIII in January 1994, which are worth an estimated $40 million or more. Id. Conse-
quently, "each team will get almost $32 million a year in television payments, compared
with $17 million under the old setup .. " Id. This deal should allow the League to accom-
modate some form of free agency without the cuts or freezes in players' benefits currently
imposed under Plan B. Presumably, the disagreement regarding money, benefits, and player
mobility is ripe for a compromise.
1991]
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II. THE SCOPE OF THE NON-STATUTORY LABOR EXEMPTION
Although team owners argue that restrictions upon player mo-
bility in professional sports 6 are designed to protect competitive
balance,37 the judiciary has not decided whether such restrictions
are actually necessary. 38 Consequently, under the proper circum-
stances, certain restraints may violate the antitrust laws. 9 This sit-
uation necessarily requires consideration of the scope of the non-
statutory labor exemption as applied in the context of current and
expired agreements. Further, if a challenged practice is not ex-
empt, courts must consider whether the restraint can be sustained
under the antitrust law's Rule of Reason.40
A. Current, Agreements
When the Supreme Court decided Mackey, the players' union
was "in a relatively weak bargaining position vis-a-vis the clubs.
""I The challenged anti-competitive practice had remained un-
changed from the time it was first imposed on the players, prior to
any collective bargaining relationship between the two sides.42
36. For a detailed discussion on the various types of player restraints in professional
sports leagues, see J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS § 5.03 (1979).
37. There are at least three views regarding the effectiveness of player restraints in
maintaining competitive balance. See generally Canes, The Social Benefits of Restrictions
on Team Quality, in GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BUSINESS 81 (R. Noll ed. 1974) (ineffec-
tive); J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 36, § 5.07, at 624 (some restraint necessary);
Jacobs & Winter, Antitrust Principles and Collective Bargaining by Athletes: Of Super-
stars in Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. 1, 5-6 (1971) (important to the success of a sports league).
The prevailing view appears to be that generalized restraint is necessary if the League is to
exist as it does today. See Ross, supra note 24, at 670-90 (some restraint is a "public good").
38. See Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 622 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
39. See, e.g., Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976) (NFL's
compensation rule), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 420 F.
Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976) (NFL's player selection draft), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 593 F.2d
1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (NBA's reserve clause, uniform player contract, and player selection draft), afi'd, 556
F.2d 682 (2nd Cir. 1977); Kapp v. National Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal.
1974) (NFL's compensation rule, player selection draft, and no-tampering rule), aff'd in
part, cross-appeal dismissed in part, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
907 (1979); Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Cheevers, 348 F. Supp. 261 (D. Mass. 1972)
(NHL's reserve clause), remanded, 472 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1972); Denver Rockets v. All-Pro
Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (NBA's four-year college rule).
40. See infra notes 99-149 and accompanying text.
41. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615-16.
42. Id. Cf. Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, 351 F.
Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (The NHL Players' Association is not recognized under labor law
as an approved collective bargaining organization and, therefore, the labor exemption does
not apply; even if it could qualify as a certified union, the labor exemption would not apply
[Vol. 8:121
6
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 5
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol8/iss1/5
PLAN B's INEVITABLE DEMISE
Moreover, because the rule imposed significant restrictions, the
Mackey court believed that legitimate bargaining would have in-
cluded some kind of negotiation over its terms." That players re-
ceived increased benefits in other areas was not, in and of itself,
indicative of a quid pro quo."
The Mackey holding does not decide whether a particular
quid pro quo must be proven to avoid antitrust liability. It does
require a sports league to at least negotiate the terms and condi-
tions of open restraints of trade with players' associations. In Mc-
Court v. California Sports, Inc.,"4 for example, a player challenged
the National Hockey League's (NHL) reserve system as violative
of antitrust laws." The collective bargaining agreement, however,
contained provisions indicating that bargaining had taken place.
These provisions stated that the Standard Player's Contract and
the reserve system were "fair and reasonable terms of employ-
ment, ' 47 that "the Standard Player's Contract required [the play-
ers] to accept all the bylaws adopted by the NHL, '' 45 and that "the
entire agreement could be voided if the NHL and the World
Hockey Association should merge[,]" or "should the reserve system
be invalidated by the courts."' 9
Nonetheless, the plaintiff in McCourt insisted, and the district
court agreed, that the reserve rule had not been the subject of good
faith bargaining. 50 This position did not survive appeal.5 1 The
Sixth Circuit noted that "what the trial court saw as a failure to
negotiate was, in fact, simply the failure to succeed, . . .52 and
concluded that the players' loss at the bargaining table was totally
irrelevant because labor law principles establish that good faith
because, as a new union, it was subject to influence by the League.).
43. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 616.
44. Id.
45. 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979).
46. Id. at 1194.
47. Id. at 1200 (quoting McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 904, 910-11
(E.D. Mich. 1978)). The Sixth Circuit agreed with the district court that this provision in
the agreement did not shield it from antitrust liability, but it did support the fact that the
agreement was bargained for in good faith. Id. at 1203.
48. Id. (quoting McCourt, 460 F.Supp. at 911).
49. Id. at 1202. This provision best supports the conclusion that the players agreed to
the contract in good faith. Otherwise, "the reserve system would be rendered too onerous
because the players would, by the merger, lose the competitive advantage of threatening to
move to the WHA." Id.
50. McCourt, 460 F. Supp. at 910.
51. McCourt, 600 F.2d at 1203 (The evidence "compels the conclusion that the reserve
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bargaining does not compel "either party negotiating over
mandatory subjects of collective bargaining to yield on its initial
bargaining position."5
Zimmerman v. National Football League54 best illustrates the
proper comparison of bargaining circumstances in antitrust sports
cases to justify use of the labor exemption. In Zimmerman, the
court noted that, in these types of cases, a particular quid pro quo
offered some proof "that the bargaining took place and that it was
done at arm's length." 5 The parties in Zimmerman presented such
proof, and that showing formed the basis for the court's decision to
apply the labor exemption.56 The court accepted that, after exten-
sive bargaining over the terms of the supplemental draft, the par-
ties reached an agreement "based on the concessions received from
the NFL.
'57
Even though a particular quid pro quo is ascertainable, a court
will apply the labor exemption without discussion. The Second
Circuit adopted this position in Wood v. National Basketball
Ass'n.5s In Wood, Judge Winter5 9 characterized a collective bar-
gaining agreement as a "unique bundle of compromises, "60 sug-
gesting that it is next to impossible or unnecessary to find separate
53. Id. at 1200. In reaching its conclusion, the Sixth Circuit referred to the National
Labor Relations Act, which provides in relevant part:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the
mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agree-
ment, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written con-
tract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such
proposal does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the
making of a concession ...
29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(8)(d) (1990) (emphasis added).
54. 632 F. Supp. 398 (D.D.C. 1986).
55. Id. at 407. It did not matter that the team owners conceded issues that they were
prepared to give up. Good faith bargaining can occur outside the agreement. Id. at 407 n.9.
See also Alexander v. National Football League, 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) P 61,730, at
73,001 (D. Minn. 1977) (Restrictions on player movement have "been agreed to by the union
as a. . . quid pro quo. . . in return for numerous other direct benefits to the employees it
represented."), aff'd sub nom., Reynolds v. National Football League, 584 F.2d 280 (8th Cir.
1978).
56. Zimmerman, 632 F. Supp. at 408.
57. Id. at 406.
58. 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
59. Before his appointment to the federal bench, Judge Winter co-authored an article
in the Yale Law Journal. See supra note 37. Although Judge Winter favors federal labor law
and policy, Wood is expressly limited to current agreements: "We need not enter this debate
or probe the exact contours of the so-called statutory or non-statutory 'labor exemptions.'
" Wood, 809 F.2d at 959.
60. Id. at 961.
[Vol. 8:121
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and adequate consideration for a particular provision in the con-
tract. 1 Thus, the court concluded, judicial interference with the
collective bargaining process is altogether improper.62 The availa-
bility of labor law remedies is exclusive. 3
As an interpretation of the law, this position is generally un-
supported-in the preceding cases, the courts were willing to re-
view the bargaining behavior of the parties to decide the applica-
tion of the exemption, expressly relying on a quid pro quo as some
evidence that bona fide bargaining took place. Although the Wood
court acknowledged that Zimmerman, McCourt, and Mackey were
indeed decided "on somewhat different grounds," '64 it did little to
reconcile them. To presume good faith bargaining not only ignores
precedent, but also designates all existing agreements as unavoid-
ably binding.
B. Expired Agreements
Though the scope of the labor exemption remains unresolved
after Wood, it is more acceptable to apply the exemption if the
agreement is still effective than to do so if the agreement has ex-
pired, at least when a court and sometimes even the parties them-
selves65 find the agreement to be a product of good faith bargain-
ing. In this situation, however, formulating a workable test is more
difficult because other labor law principles must be considered.6
For example, once an agreement expires, management has the duty
to "maintain the status quo as to wages and working conditions."67
If the parties reach a bargaining impasse, management enjoys the
authority to unilaterally change these terms of employment.6 8 It is
unclear whether management is restrained by other laws after im-
61. Id.
62. Id. at 962.
63. Id. at 962 n.5 ("Any claim of unreasonable bargaining behavior must be pursued in
an unfair labor practice proceeding charging a refusal to bargain in good faith, 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(5), not in an action under the Sherman Act.").
64. Id. at 962 n.6.
65. See, e.g., Bridgeman v. National Basketball Ass'n, 675 F. Supp. 960, 964 (D.N.J.
1987) (if collective bargaining agreement had still been in effect, there would have been no
dispute that the restrictions were covered by the labor exemption); Powell v. National Foot-
ball League, 888 F.2d 559, 564 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 711 (1991) (same).
66. Powell, 888 F.2d at 565.
67. Id. (quoting Producers Dairy Delivery Co. v. Western Conference of Teamsters
Trust Fund, 654 F.2d 625, 627 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting Peerless Roofing Co. v. NLRB, 641
F.2d 734, 736 (9th Cir. 1981))).
68. Id. (citing Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Advanced Lightweight Con-
crete Co., 484 U.S. 539 (1988)).
1991]
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passe"' and, if not, under what circumstances there is an impasse
which would justify unilateral action by management." What re-
mains clear, however, is that the collective bargaining process must
fail in actuality for the exemption to expire.
In Bridgeman v. National Basketball Ass'n 1 the court held
that "the exemption for a particular practice survives only as long
as the employer continues to impose that restriction unchanged,
and reasonably believes that the practice or a close variant of it
will be incorporated in the next collective bargaining agreement.
'7 2
If, during this time, the employer changes a practice previously
agreed upon without the players' consent, a court will not regard
the change as having been negotiated at arm's-length.7 1 Conse-
quently, the exemption is lost "whether or not the employer rea-
sonably believes that [the change] will survive in the next agree-
ment.17  This test prompted the NBA players to decertify their
union in order to discredit the owners' "reasonable belief" in nego-
tiations. 6 This behavior has been criticized as an "erosion of the
collective bargaining process, '"7 even though the two sides re-
sumed bargaining and negotiated a new agreement.
7
In Powell, the Eighth Circuit rejected the district court's im-
passe test, as it encouraged the avoidance of collective bargaining
so as to give rise to antitrust liability,7 8 and because it did not con-
69. "One such legal restraint would certainly be the antitrust laws." Powell, 888 F.2d
at 573 n.4 (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
70. On petition for rehearing en banc in Powell, Judge Lay accused the court of having
impliedly overruled Mackey: "I base my views regarding the panel majority's misinterpreta-
tion of Mackey only upon the majority's apparent but wrongful assumption that impasse
between the union and the owners has been reached." Powell, 888 F.2d at 572 n.1. The
National Labor Relations Board had found impasse on the single issue of the free agency
rule, and the district and Eighth Circuit courts agreed. Id. at 570. Judge Lay, who authored
the Mackey opinion, argued that "[i]mpasse on overall negotiations of the contract ha[d]
not been reached by the parties and, therefore, summary judgment [was] not ripe at th[e]
time." Id. (emphasis added). But see Powell, 888 F.2d at 574 (Gibson, C.J., concurring)
("[D]ivisibility or indivisibility of impasse" was not raised and, therefore, it would be im-
proper for the court to decide that there was no impasse.).
71. 675 F. Supp. 960 (D.N.J. 1987).
72. Id. at 967.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 967 n.6.
75. Gould, Players & Owners Mix It Up, 8 CALIF. LAW. 56, 103 (August 1988).
76. Id.
77. According to Lawrence Fleisher, the NBA Players' Association General Counsel,
"only because the players took that position and filed the antitrust suit do we have the
agreement that we have." Annual Judicial Conference: Second Circuit of the United States,
125 F.R.D. 293, 310 (1989) (referring to the 1987 Collective Bargaining Agreement in profes-
sional basketball).
78. Powell, 888 F.2d at 564. The Eighth Circuit characterized the district court's im-
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sider the full extent of labor law remedies.7 9 "After impasse, an
employer may make unilateral changes that are reasonably com-
prehended within its pre-impasse proposals."80 As in Wood, the
Powell court opposed an action for treble damages under the Sher-
man Act when it conflicted with federal labor law.8s This exclusive
reliance on labor law was the basis for the Eighth Circuit's conclu-
sion "that the nonstatutory labor exemption protects agreements
conceived in an ongoing collective bargaining relationship from
challenges under the antitrust laws.
8 2
This approach, however, does little more to encourage bargain-
ing-the intended purpose of the labor exemption-than
Bridgeman's reasonable belief test 83 or Powell I's impasse test.
8 4 It
merely extends the coverage of the exemption until the players
cease collective bargaining representation,8 5 or until the players ex-
haust all possible labor law remedies.8 6
The Powell opinion resulted in two responses other than the
one urged by the court, which proposed that the two sides bargain
further.8 7 First, Powell, which was already a protracted litigation,
was appealed to the United States Supreme Court. 8 Second, the
NFLPA has taken steps to terminate their labor union status in
order to establish antitrust jurisdiction. The NFLPA represents it-
self as a voluntary trade association, not as an official bargaining
representative for the players.8 9 The NFLPA's action makes the
passe test in the following manner:
The district court adopted 'impasse' as the point in which the nonstatutory la-
bor exemption expires, holding that 'once the parties reach impasse concerning
player restraint provisions, those provisions will lose their immunity and further
imposition of those conditions may result in antitrust liability.' The [district]
court reasoned that its impasse standard 'respects the labor law obligation to
bargain in good faith over mandatory bargaining subjects following expiration of
a collective bargaining agreement,' and that it 'promotes the collective bargain-
ing relationship and enhances prospects that the parties will reach compromise
on the issue.'
Powell, 888 F.2d at 564 (citation omitted).
79. Id. at 566.
80. Id. at 567 (citations omitted).
81. Id. at 568.
82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. See supra text accompanying note 72.
84. See supra text accompanying note 78.
85. Powell, 888 F.2d at 568 n.12 ("The League concedes that the Sherman Act could
be found applicable . . . if the affected employees ceased to be represented by a certified
union.").
86. Id. at 568.
87. Id.
88. The petition for certiorari, however, was denied in 1991.
89. The NFL's Union Could Win by Committing Suicide, Bus. WK., November 27,
19911
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League vulnerable to subsequent antitrust suits challenging Plan B
because the League is imposing itself on the players without their
consent.
The Supreme Court, by denying certiorari, skirted the issue of
whether "[u]nion decertification is . . .a worthy goal to pursue in
balancing labor policy with the antitrust laws."90 The evidence
seems to indicate that it is not. According to at least one commen-
tator, "the law becomes an ass" when courts fashion tests that ab-
rogate the collective bargaining process.9 1 Although directed at the
district court's holding in Bridgeman and Powell, the comment is
equally applicable to the Eighth Circuit when it impliedly directed
union decertification to acquire antitrust jurisdiction. When subse-
quent steps toward decertification are taken, the NFL Manage-
ment Council dismisses this behavior as a "bargaining ploy."92
The League contends, in a suit for declaratory relief, that "the
NFLPA's purported decertification and abandonment of bargain-
ing rights is ineffective to terminate the labor exemption recog-
nized by the Eighth Circuit."'93 The issue of antitrust immunity
1989, at 84.
90. Powell, 888 F.2d at 574 (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
91. Gould, supra note 75, at 103. The author proposed:
[Tihe labor union exception survives for a reasonable period of time after the
point at which bargaining is not, as an objective matter, likely to be achieved.
This would mean that the factors such as the decimation of the NFLPA, which
could no longer function through the collection of dues after the strike, would
weigh heavily against the availability of the labor exemption.
Id.
92. Telephone interview with John Jones, Director of Public Relations for the NFL
Management Council (March 28, 1990). The basis for this remark is two-fold: First, "72% of
the players chose benefits as their top bargaining priority, while 19% picked free agency."
News release by NFL Management Council, Q&A on NFLPA Decertification at 2 (SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED survey of over 600 veteran players) [hereinafter News Release on NFLPA
Decertification]. Second, the comments of Warren Moon, NFLPA Vice President and Hous-
ton Oiler's Players Representative, on the NFLPA decertification are revealing: "Hopefully,
this will spur some type of negotiations process because right now[,l without any leverage
because of the antitrust lawsuit[,] we pretty much would have to take anything the owners
have to offer us." Warren Moon Interview on NFLPA Decertification, KHOU-TV Houston
(Nov. 7, 1989) (transcript provided by the NFL Management Council). See also The Five
Smiths v. NFLPA, No. 3-90-CZ177, at 14 ("The purpose of such actions or threats is to
enhance the NFLPA's leverage in subsequent bargaining with the NFL clubs.") (emphasis
added).
93. Complaint, The Five Smiths v. NFLPA, at 15 (No. 3-90-CZ177) (D. Minn. filed
March 30, 1990). The League is also seeking similar equitable relief for the following restric-
tive practices:
(1) [purported decertification);
(2) That the terms and conditions of employment governing compensation and
movement of veteran free agent players, known as Plan B, as they have operated
and are to operate in 1990, are immune from antitrust attack under the nonstat-
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was decided in favor of the players, however, in summary judg-
ment proceedings in another case. 4 The result of this action will
accelerate Plan B's inevitable demise now that a court has deter-
mined that the bargaining relationship between the NFL and the
NFLPA has effectively terminated any "ongoing collective bargain-
ing relationship."95 Apparently, the NFLPA does not need to initi-
ate formal proceedings with the National Labor Relations Board.96
The goal of greater free agency has required the members of
the NFLPA to hold out until final resolution of this issue. Players'
careers are short and, therefore, anything other than an expedi-
tious settlement is not in their best interest. Indeed, it is this prac-
tical reality which prompted the League to seek a declaratory judg-
ment in federal court. 7 With an overwhelming advantage in
resources, the League will attempt to achieve dissention among the
players. Despite the various views regarding the scope of the non-
statutory labor exemption,9" antitrust review of Plan B is not fore-
closed. Consequently, absent a new arm's-length agreement, the
League will be forced to defend these practices in court.99
III. ANTITRUST'S RULE OF REASON
Section 1 of the Sherman Act condemns agreements that re-
strain trade.1 0 The Act characterizes violations as per se illegal, or
requires their evaluation under the Rule of Reason. Price fixing, 10
utory labor exemption;
(3) That the terms and conditions of employment governing compensation and
movement of veteran free agent players, known as Plan B, are, as they have
operated and are to operate in 1990, reasonable and lawful under the antitrust
laws;
(4) That the college draft, as it is to operate in 1990, is immune from antitrust
attack under the nonstatutory labor exemption;
(5) That the college draft, as it is to operate in 1990, is reasonable and lawful
under the antitrust laws; and
(6) That this Court grant such other relief as it deems just and proper.
Id. at 19-20.
94. Order, McNeil v. National Football League (Civ. No. 4-90-476) (D. Minn., filed
May 23, 1991). The court issued an immediate appeal to help expedite these proceedings,
but was denied on June 12, 1991.
95. Powell, 888 F.2d at 596.
96. In this situation, Plan B may be immune from antitrust attack by 1989, 1990, and
1991 Plan B players.
97. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
98. See Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 339 (1989) (suggesting that the exemption expires at the death of the agreement).
99. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
100. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
101. See, e.g., United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United
1991]
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diversions of markets between competitors,' 2 tying arrange-
ments,103 and group boycotts'0 4 constitute per se violations "be-
cause of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of redeem-
ing virtue. . . .,'e Lower courts have held that player restraints in
professional sports constitute group boycotts and were therefore
per se illegal- these decisions, however, have been routinely over-
ruled in favor of an inquiry into the reasonableness of the restraint
under the circumstances1 06 because, admittedly, the success of pro-
fessional sports depends on some internal controls (i.e., revenue
sharing and league-wide TV contracts) 0 7 and, perhaps, some gen-
eralized restraints on player mobility. 0 8
A reasonable restraint must be responsive to the purported
justification for the rule, and "no more restrictive than neces-
sary."109 This standard requires a court "to form a judgment about
the competitive significance of the restraint." 0 It does not matter
whether the restraint is within "the realm of reason.""' Conse-
quently, whether, as the League suggests, "Plan B represents a rea-
sonable accommodation between the interest of the players in free-
dom of movement and the interest of the clubs in preserving and
promoting competitive balance""' is not the issue. Instead, the
pro-competitive virtues of the challenged practice must outweigh
the anti-competitive evils of the restraint in order to survive a
Rule of Reason analysis."'
Courts are generally perplexed when applying balancing tests.
States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 397 (1927).
102. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc. 405 U.S. 596 (1972); Timken Roller
Bearing Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 593 (1951).
103. See, e.g., Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969);
Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
104. See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Orig-
inator's Guild of America v. FTC, 321 U.S. 457 (1941).
105. Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 618 (8th Cir. 1976) cert. dis-
missed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977) (quoting Northern Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5
(1958)).
106. See, e.g., Mackey, 543 F.2d at 619; Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738
(D.D.C. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 593 F.2d 1173, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
107. See 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982).
108. See Canes, The Social Benefits of Restrictions on Team Quality, in GOVERNMENT
AND THE SPORTS BUSINESs 81 (R. Noll ed. 1974). See also supra note 37 and accompanying
text.
109. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 620.
110. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (quot-
ing National Soc'y of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978)).
111. National Soc'y of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688
(1978).
112.- The Five Smiths, supra note 93, at 17.
113. Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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In finding League rules violative of antitrust law's Rule of Reason,
courts have held that there is nothing pro-competitive about them
in an economic sense."" Assuming some pro-competitive effect,
their contributions to competitive balance are of little'" or no im-
portance. 11 6 In any event, a court would be wrong if it did not at-
tempt a balance, though taken literally, a net economic pro-com-
petitive effect could not be shown. 17 Some form of player restraint
should be viewed as pro-competitive if it is necessary in producing
the "NFL" product." 8
In National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Re-
gents,"' the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the
NCAA's television plan, which limited the amount of television
coverage of individual teams, was necessary to preserve college
football as a distinctive product. Writing for the Court, Justice
Stevens concluded that the plan was not necessary to protect live
attendance at non-televised games, 20 maintain competitive bal-
ance 12 or increase the game's marketability as a form of entertain-
ment. 22 Because the plan could not be defended as pro-competi-
114. Id. at 1186 (The college draft rule "does not increase competition in the economic
sense of encouraging others to enter the market and to offer the product at a lower cost.
Because the draft's 'anti-competitive' and 'pro-competitive' effects are not comparable, it is
impossible to 'net them out' in the usual rule of reason balancing.").
115. Id. at 1184 n.46. "[W]e think that two other factors contribute at least as much as
the player draft to producing and maintaining a competitive balance in the
league-television revenues and coaching changes." Id.
116. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 621 ("Even assuming the Rule did foster competitive bal-
ance .. .there were other legal means available to achieve that end- e.g., the competition
committee, multiple year contracts, and special incentives. The court further concluded that
elimination of the [Rule] would have no significant disruptive effects, either immediate or
long term, on professional football.").
117. See National Soc'y of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679
(1978).
118. Cf. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 102
(1984) (Some NCAA rules preserve the character of college sports, "and as a result enables a
product to be marketed which might otherwise be unavailable."). See also Powell II, 690 F.
Supp. at 816 ("Some leveling and balancing rules appear necessary to keep the various
teams on a competitive basis, without which public interest in any sport quickly fades.")
(quoting Reynolds v. National Football League, 584 F.2d 280, 287 (8th Cir. 1978)).
119. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
120. This argument presupposes that competition between live and televised games is
disruptive. Accordingly, the Court reaffirmed a truism of antitrust law: "[Tihe Rule of Rea-
.son does not support a defense based on the assumption that competition itself is unreason-
able." Id. at 117 (quoting National Soc'y of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435
U.S. 679, 696 (1978)).
121. Id. at 119. "The television plan is not even arguabl tailored to serve such an
interest[,]" in that there was no evidence of any intent to equalize the strength of the teams
financially or otherwise. Id.
122. Id. at 114. "NCAA football could be marketed just as effectively without" such
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tive in terms of responsiveness to institutional concerns, it was an
unreasonable restraint of trade.
123
Plan B, however, is responsive to the concerns of the League.
Many players are designated unconditional free agents each
year.124 Of the eleven teams who signed the most Plan B players in
1989, two teams won their division and seven improved their
records from the previous year.' 5 As the League contends, Plan B
allows teams to build for the future by protecting "the nucleus of
the ball clubs."'26 The remaining players can test the market with-
out diminishing the quality of professional football.127 This evi-
dence supports only the view that a court should at least attempt
to balance between these pro-competitive justifications and the
anti-competitive effects of the restraint. Whether there is enough
evidence to conclude that Plan B "is no more restrictive than nec-
essary" 28 is, at best, speculative. The opposite may be true, pri-
marily if greater movement makes teams more competitive.
The League is likely to argue that its efforts deserve the bene-
fit of the doubt. As some commentators reason, "For an entity of-
fering a true league competition, as opposed to coordinated promo-
controls. Id.
123. Id. at 120.
124. In 1989, 229 of the 619 eligible players changed teams. Of these players, almost
half are eventually released. See also New Release by NFL Management Council, Q&A on
Plan B for 1990, at 1 [hereinafter News Release on Plan B for 1990] ("Of the 229 uncondi-
tional free agents who changed teams [in 1989], 133 were under contract through the season,
including 115 active players."). The figures for 1990 and 1991 Plan B players were 184 of
490 and 139 out of 518, respectively. These figures were released by the National Football
League Management Council.
125. The Denver Broncos were the AFC West Champion at 11-5, and the Cleveland
Browns were the AFC Central Champion at 9-6-1. News Release on Plan B for 1990, supra
note 124, at 1.
126. Telephone interview with John Jones, Public Relations Director for the NFL
Management Council (Mar. 29, 1990).
127. When asked whether full free agency would be better, the League answered in the
negative:
Plan B is no microcosm of unrestricted free agency. It is a system designed to
protect competitive balance. Total free agency jeopardizes competitive balance
because teams with economic advantages could outbid other clubs for top play-
ers. Economic imbalance would lead to competitive imbalance on the field. Plan
B responded to the interests of the teams, the NFLPA and the fans. Teams
wanted to build for the future, and Plan B allowed clubs to protect 37 players.
The NFLPA wanted player movement, and more NFL free agents moved under
Plan B than the combined total of free agents moving in the NBA and baseball
since 1982. Fans want competitive games, and Plan B protected competitive bal-
ance, which this season helped the NFL set all-time records for attendance and
teams in playoff contention on the final weekend.
News Release on Plan B for 1990, supra note 124, at 4.
128. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 620.
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tion of a sports activity, equalization of competition is not a
discretionary choice. 1 29 Thus, "[i]n any balance of competitive ef-
fects, such considerations are surely entitled to extra weight."1 0
Courts, however, are not necessarily persuaded by this logic be-
cause restraints can be characterized as necessary as a matter of
law. In Mackey, for example, the court claimed that the old free
agency rule was "significantly more restrictive than necessary." 131
Further, in Smith v. Pro Football, Inc,3 2 the district court re-
garded the college draft as "the most restrictive one imagin-
able." ' On appeal, the appellate court also held without reserva-
tion "that the effect of the draft . . . was to 'suppress or even
destroy competition' in the market for players' services.M
34
Because Plan B was seemingly "designed to withstand legal
attack,"'35 a court may consider this fact for purposes of balancing.
Restrictions on player movement under Plan B, for example, no
longer apply to all players irrespective of "status or ability."'3 6
They only "operate[] as [) perpetual restriction[s] " with respect to
those who are protected by their teams.137 Although Plan B has
responded to these concerns, it has failed in others. For example, it
does not allow players' input as to the amount of compensation
129. J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS § 5.07 (Supp. 1985).
130. Id.
131. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 622.
132. 420 F. Supp 738 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C.
Cir. 1978).
133. Id. at 746. The court held the college draft was per se illegal and, therefore, the
analysis under the Rule of Reason was dicta.
134. Smith v. Pro Football, 593 F.2d 1173, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (quoting Chicago Bd.
of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)).
135. News Release on Plan B for 1990, supra note 124, at 4.
136. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 622 (quantities which influenced the court in deciding that
the Rozelle Rule was a violation of antitrust law's Rule of Reason).
137. Unrestricted free agents may be subject to the First Refusal/Compensation sys-
tem if a player is not signed between February 2 and April 1. Consequently, if the old club
matches an offer, the player is restrained indefinitely, as would be the case if a restricted
free agent's offer is matched. In both situations, however, without an offer, a player has no
chance of moving or making a team if released.
According to sports agent Bob Woolf, Plan B has been so successful that owners will be
"less aggressive this year. . . . It has elevated salaries and allowed players to test the mar-
ket. And teams that signed players did better." The Oregonian, Feb. 2, 1990, at E2, col. 1.
Referring to the largest sports TV package ever negotiated, however, sports agent Leigh
Steinberg commented: "The rights fees fueled a salary explosion in baseball .... Now
things will explode in the N.F.L. If the teams have money, they'll spend it." Zoglin, The
Great TV Takeover, Time, Mar. 26, 1990, at 68. This spending spree should hopefully cre-
ate a demand for restricted Plan B players. It is likely, however, that should a restricted free
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paid to the old club138 and is still administered "in conjunction
with other anti-competitive practices," 13 9 such as the Standard
Player's Contract and the college draft.
140
It remains unclear how a court will balance and weigh these
respective interests. The evidence suggests that the Rule of Reason
standard is, perhaps, insurmountable in this situation. First, the
judiciary is historically opposed to anti-competitive restraints.'
Second, greater free agency is successfully promoted in other pro-
fessional sports. 4 2 Third, the League did not collapse during a lim-
ited period of full free agency.43 Finally, there is nothing "magi-
cal" about protecting thirty-seven players.
1 44
If a court were to decide that the protection of thirty-seven is
necessary to maintain competitive balance, the League would ap-
parently only negotiate "some reasonable variant" 45 to be in-
138. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 622 (procedural protection relevant to rule of reason analy-
sis). See also Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 726
F.2d 1381, 1397-98 (9th Cir. 1984), which suggested that an NFL rule which restrained team
movement "was not reasonably necessary to the production and sale of the NFL product
[absent] [s]ome sort of procedural mechanism." Thus, some form of salary arbitration and
appeals process may be required.
139. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 621 (Standard Player's Contract, draft, and no-tampering
rules operate as additional restraints on player mobility).
140. In Powell, the plaintiffs claim these league practices constitute unlawful player
restraints. Powell, 888 F.2d at 561. Under the district court's impasse test, until there is an
impasse in bargaining as to these issues, the labor exemption applies. See supra note 24 and
accompanying text. Consequently, only the Right of First Refusal/Compensation system was
subject to review on appeal. Powell, 888 F.2d at 561. Antitrust review of these practices is
likely to proceed, however, under the same theory advanced with respect to Plan B-union
decertification.
141. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
142. Presumably, only some generalized restraint is necessary to maintain competitive
balance. A court should look to other professional sports as guidelines. In baseball, for ex-
ample, unrestricted free agency is available for six-year veteran players, and in basketball,
the number of years to qualify for free agency diminishes over time. See generally
Staudohar and McAtee, supra note 29, at 231. The authors argue that free agency in foot-
ball is not as meaningful because one free agent has less of an impact on the team's success,
revenue sharing is anti-competitive in that there is little incentive to bid on players, and
that an average player's career lasts 3.2 years. Id. at 230. But see Singman, supra note 14, at
271 (free agency system would work in football if draft choice compensation were
eliminated).
143. This period existed between the 1976 Mackey decision and the 1977 settlement
and new collective bargaining agreement. During this period, one player was re-signed by
the Los Angeles Rams, two left the defending Super Bowl champion the Dallas Cowboys to
reside in the Washington area, one left the Miami Dolphins to play for the Cleveland
Browns, and the Kansas City Chiefs signed no free agents, despite rumors to the contrary.
Ross, supra note 24, at 681-82 n.167 (citations omitted).
144. Telephone interview with Luc Terhaar, Co-counsel for Plaintiffs in Powell (Apr.
11, 1990).
145. News Release on Plan B for 1990, supra note 124, at 4.
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cluded in a new collective bargaining agreement. In other words,
the courts will be directing the conditions by which free agency is
established, contrary to their expressed beliefs that "the subject of
player movement restrictions is a proper one for resolution in the
collective bargaining context."" 6
This fact alone may prevent a court from ruling in favor of
Plan B. Although no one knows for certain what the likely outcome
will be, if history repeats itself, a new collective bargaining agree-
ment will be negotiated and impending antitrust suits, because of
high costs, litigation uncertainties, and the threat of treble dam-
ages, will be settled.1 4 7 Whether this collective bargaining/class ac-
tion settlement approach is desirable is a question of policy for
Congress. If Congress remains silent, this trend is likely to con-
tinue. Federal legislation offering similar incentives to eventually
negotiate a new agreement under the labor laws may be preferable,
if only to restrict courts from concluding that a particular player
restraint is "no more restrictive than necessary."1 '8
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court seems content on letting case law develop
regarding the scope of the non-statutory labor exemption. By de-
nying certiorari, however, the Court left Powell as the law in the
Eighth Circuit, thereby significantly expanding the coverage of the
exemption. This result has settled Powell, but opens the door to
future Plan B litigation. Plan B suits are not seriously impaired by
the labor exemption now that the NFLPA has effectively decerti-
fled. The players have, until now, failed at every other level, "1 9 but
because Plan B is arguably anti-competitive, union decertification
should bring about a material change in the agency system. Admit-
tedly, union decertification may be undesirable policy. Powell,
however, makes this behavior necessary if the players are going to
sell their services in a more fair and competitive market.
146. Reynolds v. National Football League, 584 F.2d 280, 289 (8th Cir. 1978).
147. See e.g., Alexander v. National Football League, 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) P
61,730 (D. Minn. 1977) (class action settlement); Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n.,
389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (class action settlement). See also supra notes 71-77 (re-
ferring to the Bridgeman case).
148. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 620.
149. These unsuccessful steps included failed negotiations, an unsuccessful strike, and
a prolonged court battle.
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